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Insuring the Protection of ERISA Plan
Participants: ERISA Preemption and the
Federal Government's Duty To Regulate SelfInsured Health Plans
DENNIS K. SCHAEFFERt
INTRODUCTION

In passing ERISA, Congress reserved to itself the power
to regulate employee pension and welfare benefit plans.'
Yet Congress focused the bulk of ERISA's substantive provisions on pension plans.2 Indeed, the terms that comprise
t J.D. Candidate, 1999, SUNY at Buffalo School of Law; B.A., 1993, Boston
College. My thanks to Bridget M'Guinness, whose constant support and
understanding make all things possible. My thanks as well to Professor James
Wooten for providing me with valuable direction and insight.
1. See The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 §§ 2(a), 514,
Pub. L. No. 93-406 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§1001(a) et seq.) (please note
that in keeping with the majority of other scholarship concerning ERISA,
citations to ERISA in this Comment refer to sections of the public law and not
the U.S.C.) [hereinafter ERISA]; see also SUBCOMMITIEE ON LABOR OF THE
HOUSE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUB. WELFARE, 94TI CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECuRITY ACT OF 1974, at 4760 (1976)

("pervasive Federal interest and the interests of uniformity with respect to
interstate plans required-but for certain exceptions-the displacement of State
action in the field of private employee benefit programs"); Alessi v. RaybestosManhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981) (stating that ERISA was designed to
"establish pension plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern.").
2. See Jeffrey Lenhart, ERISA Preemption: The Effect of Stop-Loss
Insurance on Self-Insured Health Plans, 14 VA. TAX. REV. 615 (1995). Mr.
Lenhart observes that "ERISA's substantive provisions are, for the most part,
directed at employee pension plans, but the expansive scope of its preemption
provision reaches employee welfare benefit plans as well." Id. at 618. Lenhart
notes that regulations of these welfare benefit plans appear only in one of
ERISA's four titles. Within that one title, welfare benefit plan provisions
account for less than half of the substantive provisions. See id. at 618 n.15.; see
also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts Travelers Ins. Co., 471 U.S.
724, 732 (1985) ("ERISA imposes upon pension plans a variety of substantive
requirements relating to participation, funding and vesting.... [yet] ERISA...
contains almost no federal regulation of the terms of [employee welfare] benefit
plans."); New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
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the statute's acronym - "Employee Retirement Income Security Act" - evince a concern with the security of workers'
pensions.3

Although Congress focused ERISA on employees' pension benefits, it failed to regulate employees' welfare benefit
plans in a similarly comprehensive fashion.4 Nevertheless,
Congress imbued ERISA with a sweeping preemptive effect
on state laws that concerned employee welfare benefit
plans.5 Congress' decision to place welfare benefit plans
exclusively under ERISA's purview was due in part to
corporate concerns over the confusing, complex and interstate nature of administering employee welfare benefits.6
The federal government's combined action and inaction in
this regard has caused employee welfare benefits to

Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 651 (1995) ("[ERISA] does not go about
protecting [welfare] plan participants and their beneficiaries by requiring
employers to provide any given set of minimum benefits, but instead controls
the administration of benefit plans"). See generally Michael Gordon, Overview,
Why Was ERISA Enacted?, in U.S. SENATE, SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, THE
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: THE FIRST DECADE 21-29

(1984). Mr. Gordon notes that the origins of ERISA can be traced to the 1960s,
when the public became increasingly concerned with alleged widespread
mismanagement and underfunding of pensions. See id. at 22.
3. ERISA defines pensions as plans that provide income deferral or
retirement income. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2). ERISA primarily regulates pensions.
See ERISA, supra note 1 and accompanying text. ERISA, however, does not
regulate all pensions equally. By far the most heavily regulated type of pension
is the "defined benefit" pension. See ERISA: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 31-32
(Martin Wald and David E. Kenty, eds., 1991) [hereinafter ERISA: A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE]. The fact that ERISA is focused on "defined benefit"
plans would seem to indicate that the law was meant to create security for
workers who rely on traditional pension benefits.
4. See, e.g., Met Life, 471 U.S. at 732.
5. See ERISA § 514(a) ("the provisions of this title and title IV shall
supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to
any employee benefit plan...."); id. § 3(1) ("[t]he terms 'employee welfare
benefit plan' and 'welfare plan' mean any plan, fund or program... maintained
by an employer.., for the purpose of providing ... medical, surgical or hospital
care or benefits .... ."); Met Life 471 U.S. at 726 (1985) ('"The phrase 'relate to'
was given its broad common-sense meaning, such that a state law 'relatets] to' a
benefit plan 'in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with for
reference to such a plan," (quoting Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97
(1983)).
6. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46 (1987) ("[ERISA is]
intended to preempt the field [of employee benefit plans] for Federal
regulations, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and
local regulation of employee benefit plans."); see also Northern Group Serv., Inc.
v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 833 F.2d 85, 88 (6th Cir. 1987).
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experience a "regulatory vacuum."7 The situation is properly characterized as a "vacuum" because ERISA prohibits
states from regulating employee welfare benefit plans in
spite of federal silence on the matter.8 The regulatory
vacuum surrounding welfare benefit plans has come at the
expense of the participants and beneficiaries of those
welfare benefit plans. Take the following example:
A delivery truck hit Don Thompson, a twelve year-old boy from
rural Virginia, while he was riding his bike along a country road.
Don's injuries are not life threatening. Don is fortunate because
his father works at the local mill and, through his employer, participates in a group health care plan. Furthermore, Virginia State
law requires insurance companies to provide coverage for injuries
arising out of an auto accident in all of their group health care
plans. It would appear that Don and his family are covered for the
costs of treating his injuries.
However, the mill did not buy its medical insurance from a third
party insurance company. Instead, it has "self-insured" its health
care plan. ERISA preempts the pertinent Virginia law from applying to the employer's health care plan. The employer's health
care plan, fully aware of ERISA's preemptive effect, has excluded
coverage for injuries sustained in connection with an auto accident.
For its part, ERISA does not address whether an employee welfare
benefit plan must provide such coverage. Due to ERISA's preemption of Virginia's law and its silence on the issue, Don's family
will be liable for $63,000 in medical bills. 9

The above scenario is but a leading example in a parade
of horribles; a parade that continues to be a subject of de-

bate.
This Comment addresses a few of the many issues that
7. Fox and Schaffer, Health Policy and ERISA, 14 J. HEALTH POL. POLy & L.
239, 240 (1989). See also Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article About the
Language of ERISA Preemption?A Case Study of the Failureof Textualism, 33

HARv. J. LEGIS. 35, 36-39 (1996) (arguing that ERISA's broad preemptive effect
is odd because as law that is intended to provide significant federal protection,
ERISA instead has created a regulatory vacuum by invalidating numerous
state regulations).
8. Id.

9. See Thompson v. Talquin, 928 F.2d 649 (4th. Cir. 1991).
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underpin the current problems surrounding federal and
state regulation of employee health care plans. The analysis
begins by providing a brief overview of the genesis and
scope of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act.
Furthermore, the Comment addresses the ways in which
judicial interpretation has led to ERISA having a powerful
preemptive effect on state law. The Comment then offers
both historical and present-day perspectives on how employers use certain insurance mechanisms (namely "selfinsurance" and "stop-loss insurance") as methods to avoid
state regulation. By utilizing these techniques, many employers have capitalized on ERISA's preemption of state
laws; laws that would otherwise regulate, albeit indirectly,
employee welfare benefit plans. This Comment will also analyze the ways in which the circuit courts have responded
to employers' efforts to evade state regulation. Notably, the
majority of the circuits have validated employers' efforts to
capitalize on ERISA preemption through the use of certain
insurance techniques.
The irony of this situation is that Congress, in passing
ERISA, simultaneously acknowledged the need for states to
regulate the substantive terms of certain employee welfare
benefit plans and denied that there was a need for states to
regulate the substantive terms of other welfare benefit
plans. The Comment concludes that the relevant case law
and ERISA's language will prohibit the states from
regulating employers that self-insure their welfare benefit
plans. The Comment calls for federal intervention, noting
that the federal government has an affirmative duty to
address this situation through comprehensive and
reasonable regulation of employee welfare benefit plans-a
responsibility that ERISA has prevented the states from
assuming.

10. What is referred to here is the different ways in which ERISA treats
employee welfare benefit plans that are insured traditionally through a thirdparty insurance provider and the ways in which ERISA treats employee welfare
benefit plans that are "self-insured" or "self-funded." See infra Parts III and IV;
THE NEW YORK STATE HEALTH ADVISORY COUNCIL & THE NEW YORK BUSINESS
GROUP ON HEALTH, SELF-INSURANCE & HEALTH CARE BENEFITS IN NEW YORK
STATE: AN EXPLORATORY STATEMENT AND DESCRIPTiVE ANALYSIS 55 (1982)
[hereinafter STATE HEALTH ADVISORY COUNCIL].
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SWEEPING PREEMPTIVE EFFECT

America's Labor movement and the general public's
fear over alleged corporate mismanagement of employee
pension funds motivated Congress to draft and pass ERISA
in 1974. The seminal incident that sparked ERISA's
passage is known as the "Studebaker Incident."" Studebaker, the automobile manufacturer, closed a plant in
South Bend, Indiana in 1963. After the plant closed, it was
revealed that the plant's pension fund could not cover the
pensions of nearly seven thousand former Studebaker
employees. This shortfall caused many of these workers to
lose most, if not all, of their anticipated pension benefits. 2
The Studebaker Incident pushed the issue of securing
employee benefits into the national spotlight, and set the
stage for ERISA's eventual passage."
ERISA imposed heavy regulatory burdens on
employers. As a result, Congress passed ERISA in spite of
resistance from corporate America.' 4 Perhaps in response to
11. See Michael Allen, Memorandum, The Studebaker Incident and Its
Influence on the Private Pension Plan Reform Movement, in PENSION AND
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAw 62-65 (John H. Langbein and Bruce A. Wolk, eds.,
1995).
12. Prior to ERISA, employers generally retained the right to revoke
accrued pension benefits. See Norman P. Stein, Reversions from Pension Plans:
History, Policies, and Prospects, 44 TAX L. REV. 259, 279-80 (1989). Employers
usually characterized pension benefits as gifts. See id. The Studebaker
employees, then, had no recourse when the ftmding for the pension trust
expired.
13. See id.
14. See, e.g., A&P HEARINGS H.R. 10470, at 261-63 (Oct. 12, 1973). This
collection of legislative history contains a letter from Larry Brown, Chairman of
Canton's Congressional Action Committee. Id. at 265. Mr. Brown addressed this
letter to John M. Martin, Jr., Chief Counsel for the Committee on Ways and
Means. Id. Mr. Brown communicated the following concerns with federal
regulation of employee pensions:
We oppose:
1. Any change that would impose a self-employed contribution limit on
qualified corporate pension plans.
2. Additional funding requirements with no consideration of increased
costs.
3. Too early vesting, which will encourage 'job hopping" and invalidate
one of the original purposes of private pensions to retain employees.
4. Portability; adequate vesting makes this academic. Also, it is costly
and would ultimately lead to lower benefits.
5. Giving Federal administrative officials added power to regulate or
interfere in the management ofprivate pensionplans in the absence of a
proven need for such additionalpowers.
Id. (emphasis added).
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these corporate concerns, Congress incorporated certain
concessions into ERISA. The principal concession to
business interests was ERISA's preemption clause section 514(a). Section 514(a) was intended to reduce the
administrative costs and headaches associated with
running employee welfare benefit plans."
Prior to ERISA, business interests complained about
how difficult it was to deal with conflicting state regulation
of pension and welfare benefit plans. 6 Corporate lobbyists
insisted that this patchwork system of regulation placed
unmanageable burdens on personnel managers and systems.17 Business interests also bemoaned the difficulties of
coordinating employee benefit plans across state lines;
inevitably there were "divergent regulatory schemes in different states." 8 These lobbyists encouraged the federal
government, through ERISA, to make regulation of ,employee benefits exclusively a federal matter.

15. As will be discussed throughout the Comment, ERISA preemption
eliminated the problem that flowed from the states' disparate and often
conflicting regulation of employee benefit plans. See supra note 6 and
accompanying text; infra note 18 and accompanying text.
16. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (containing citations to court
cases that discuss the ways in which ERISA streamlined employers'
administration of employee benefit plans).
17. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1987).
18. See id. Along these lines, Representative Dent has stated:
The most efficient way to meet these responsibilities is to establish a
uniform administrative scheme, which provides a set of standard
procedures to guide processing of claims and disbursement of benefits.
Such a system is difficult to achieve, however, if a benefit plan is
subject to differing regulatory requirements in differing States.... [as
a result ERISA's preemption provision must] ensure... that the
administrative practices of a benefit plan will be governed by only a
singles set of regulations.
Id. (citing 120 Cong. Rec. 29,197 (1974)). See also Ingersoll-Rand Co. v.
McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990).
[T]o ensure that plans and plan sponsors would be subject to a uniform
body of benefits law; the goal was to minimize the administrative and
financial burden of complying with conflicting directives among States
or between States and the Federal Government... [and to prevent] the
potential for conflict in substantive law.., requiring the tailoring of
plans and employer conduct to the peculiarities of the law of each
jurisdiction.
Ingersoll-Rand,498 U.S. at 142; ERISA: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 3,
at 250.
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II. ERISA PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW
A. Step One: The Preemption Clause
None of ERISA's provisions have created "more litigation or more confusion than ERISA's preemption provisions. " 9 This confusion begins with the fact that the application of ERISA's preemption clause is a three-step process.2" The first step in ERISA preemption analysis is to

determine whether the state law falls within ERISA's

general preemption clause.2 This clause in ERISA
preempts any state law that "relates to" an employee
benefit plan.
In order to give effect to ERISA's goal of uniform regulation,22 the Supreme Court has given this phrase

sweeping effect." The Supreme Court, as well as the circuit
courts, have made it clear that ERISA will preempt state

laws that refer to or are connected with employee benefit

plans. 24 Certain courts have gone further and found that
ERISA preempts state laws that have the purpose and
effect of regulating employee benefit plans. In addition,
federal courts are also on guard for any "backdoor" attempts
to regulate these benefit plans, and have stated a

willingness to look beyond the form of state laws and to sift
through a law's purpose and effect in order to uphold
ERISA's policy of preemption.26 In light of this judicial construction, then, the preemption clause absolutely prohibits
any state encroachment into this realm of exclusive federal
19. ERISA: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supranote 3, at 244.

20. See ERISA § 514(a), (b)(2)(A), (b)(2)(B) (1992).
21. See United Food & Commercial Workers & Employers Ariz. Health &
Welfare Trust v. Pacyga, 801 F.2d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 1986); Tri-State Mach.,
Inc. v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 309, 311 (4th Cir. 1994).
22. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co v. Massachusetts Travelers Ins. Co.,
471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985). See also Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S.
504, 525 (1981) (holding that "even indirect state action bearing on private
pensions may encroach upon the area of exclusive federal concern").
24. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983); see also Met
Life, 471 U.S. at 739; FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 (1990).
25. See American Med. Sec., Inc. v. Bartlett, 111 F.3d 358, 363 (4th Cir.
1997).
26. See Holliday, 498 U.S. at 56. The court stated that ERISA's plain
language required the court to "reach back-door attempts by states to regulate
core ERISA concerns ..... Id.
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concern.
B. Step Two: The Savings Clause
Congress followed the general preemption clause with
the savings clause. While the general preemption clause
takes power from the states, the savings clause gives power
back to the states. Indeed, the savings clause was a broad
return of power to the states.27 The savings clause exempts
from ERISA's general preemption clause the states' power
to regulate the insurance, banking and securities industries. With respect to insurance, the savings clause was
consistent with a long-time federal policy on which industries should be state-regulated."
Federal courts have inferred that Congress did not seek
to usurp traditional areas of state authority through
ERISA, and as a result have given the savings clause a
broad construction-similar to the construction given to the
general preemption clause."0 Thus, sections 514(a) and
514(b)(2)(A) combine to produce equally extreme and
contrary grants of power. Justice Blackmun has wryly
remarked that "[tihe two preemption sections, while clear
enough on their faces, perhaps are not a model of legislative
drafting."3 Justice Blackmun went on to observe that
"[w]hile Congress occasionally decides to return to the
States what it has previously taken away, it does not
normally do both at the same time." 2
C. Step Three: The Deemer Clause
The process of evaluating whether a state law will
27. See ERISA § 514 (b)(2)(A) (1992) ("Except as provided in subparagraph

(B), nothing in this title shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person [or
corporation] from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banldng, or
securities.").
28. See id.
29. See McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, 15 U.S.C. § 1011, et seq. (1992)
(reserving to the states the exclusive right to regulate the insurance industry
within their own respective sovereignties). "The business of insurance, and
every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States
which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business." Id. § 1012(a).
30. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co v. Massachusetts Travelers Ins. Co., 471
U.S. 724, 740 (1985).
31. Id. at 739.
32. Id.
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survive ERISA preemption is further complicated by
ERISA's deemer clause. Once a court has decided that the
general preemption clause preempts a state law, but that
the savings clause protects that state law from general
preemption (perhaps, for example, because the state law
regulates the insurance industry), the court still must make
yet a third ruling.3"
In this third step, a court must discern whether the law
has effectively "deemed" an employee benefit plan to be an
insurance company or in the business of insuring." The
deemer clause, ultimately, will preempt valid state
regulations to the extent that those regulations apply to or
are intended to affect the administration of ERISAregulated employee benefit plans.36 The deemer clause,
then, expands on the confusion noted by Justice Blackmun
37
That is,
in Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Massachusetts.
an analysis of the deemer clause yields the inference that
"Congress appears to have taken away, returned, and again
from the states certain powers-all in the same
taken away
38
statute."

33. See ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B) (1992) ("Neither an employee benefit plan...
nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance
company or... engaged in the business of insurance ... for purposes of any law
of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies [or] insurance
contracts . .. ").
34. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58-61 (1990) (discussing
Pennsylvania anti-subrogation law that clearly "relates to" an employee benefit
plan but also clearly is a regulation aimed at the insurance industry); see
generally Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 127-129 (1982)
(discussing generally how a court determines whether a state law actually
regulates the insurance industry).
35. See Holliday, 498 U.S. at 61; United Food & Commercial Workers &
Employers Ariz. Health & Welfare Trust v. Pacyga, 801 F.2d 1157, 1160 (9th
Cir. 1986).
36. See Holliday, 498 U.S. at 62-64 (stating, among other things, "[wle read
the deemer clause to exempt... [employee benefit plans] from state laws that
'regulate insurance' within the meaning of the saving clause"); Safeco Life Ins.
Co. v. Musser, 65 F.3d 647, 651-52 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that "the Court in
prior cases had deemed preempted state laws that had the effect of regulating
the structure or administration of ERISA plans or providing avenues outside of
the ERISA framework to vindicate employees' rights under these plans.").
37. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts Travelers Ins. Co., 471
U.S. 724, 739 (1985).
38. See Lenhart, supranote 2, at 621.
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III. UNFORESEEN CONSEQUENCES OF ERISA

A. States Suffer a Defeat-Was It Foreseen?
Congress' enactment of ERISA and the courts'
interpretation of it represented, among other things, a blow
to the states and their efforts to regulate employee welfare
benefit plans. The states, however, did not take this defeat
lying down.
Certain scholars have argued that the health care and
insurance industry experts did not anticipate this "defeat."
According to this perspective, experts who did pay attention
to ERISA's health care implications39 acknowledged, at the
time of passage, that ERISA would undoubtedly create
serious regulatory gaps for employee welfare benefit plans.
These experts speculated, however, that either federal
regulations concerning employee welfare benefit plans or
national health insurance would likely fill these gaps in
regulation.4" However, the years following ERISA's passage
witnessed a combination of changes in the social, economic
and political climate of America.4 With these changes,
hopes faded that new federal regulations would address the
"regulatory gap.' These hopes were dashed altogether
when President Carter's push for health care reform

39. See Fox and Schaffer, supra note 7, at 243-244. The authors provide an
illuminating look at the actual players in ERISA's passage. They note that
other issues in the health care insurance industry occupied the attention of
experts and analysts during the period of ERISA's adoption. See id. The authors
quote a then employee of the Health Insurance Association of America, "I don't
think anybody was thinking of the health implications of ERISA. Thus
congressional staff and a few lobbyists made a major decision about employee
benefits policy as if it were a technical issue." Id. at 244.
40. See id.
41. See generally Edward R. Crane, The Reagan Record: Change, But Not
Quite a Reagan 'Revolution,' SAN DIEGO UNION & TRIBUNE, Jan. 15, 1989, at C5.
Mr. Crane noted in retrospect of the Great Communicator's career in office:
The great achievement of Ronald Reagan, the one aspect of his eight
years as chief of state [sic) that might be termed "revolutionary," was
his remarkable ability to change the terms of political debate in
America... In 1980 President Reagan ran an explicitly ideological
campaign, and in so doing struck a responsive chord with the American
electorate.
Id.; see also Fox and Schaffer, supranote 7, at 244-245.
42. Fox and Schaffer, supranote 7, at 244-245.
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failed.43 In fact, the late 1970s arguably marked the
beginning of the end for the "American Welfare State."4
The onset of "Reaganomics" brought massive federal
deregulation to many industries, thus assuring that the
states would be left to contend with the regulatory vacuum
surrounding employee health care plans. 45 The states found

that ERISA prevented them from stepping into the
regulatory gap that ERISA had created.46
B. Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Massachusetts47
To be sure, ERISA prevented states from directly regulating employee welfare benefit plans. Some states responded to this impasse by finding a way to 4get around
ERISA preemption and fill regulatory gaps.4 In 1985,
Massachusetts passed a law9 requiring insurance
companies that sold general group health care policies to
employers in Massachusetts to provide certain minimum
benefits with those policies. The relevant section of the law,
47B, required insurance companies to provide minimum
mental health care benefits to the beneficiaries of a group
43. See id. at 244.
44. See id.
45. See Rena Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental Mandates and the "New
(New) Federalism: Devolution, Revolution or Reform?, 81 MINN. L. REV. 97
(1996). The author notes that President Reagan's program of deregulation
included the goals of reducing the federal bureaucracy's bulk and deregulating
public health. See id. at 113-14. The author went on to note:
By claiming to have the states' interest in more authority... and by
promising to dismantle the federal bureaucracies that had stolen that
authority, the administration created political cover for... rolling back
regulation that its major industrial supporters found offensive.
Id. at 118; see also Fox and Schaffer, supranote 7, at 244-245.
46. See supra Part II (discussing scope and effect of ERISA preemption).
47. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
48. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 47B (1984); see also infra note 60 (noting
other state laws mandating coverage for certain health care benefits).
49. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 47B (1984); see also Met Life, 471 U.S. at
730 (noting that section 47B required health insurance policies to provide,
among other things, minimum amounts of coverage for confinement in a mental
hospital as well as minimum outpatient benefits). For another example of statemandated benefit laws see STATE HEALTH ADVISORY

CoUNCIL,

supra note 10, at

60. The report indicates that in New York, coverage mandates included: "(1)
Home Health Care, (2) Maternity Care Coverage, (3) Pre-Admission testing
prior to surgery, (4) Coverage of medical services provided in hospital facilities,
(5) second Surgical Opinion, (6) Coverage in group policies of newborn infants
from moment of birth." Id.
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health care policy."
Representatives from the insurance industry challenged
the law, claiming that Massachusetts was regulating the
insurance industry in this way only so that it could regulate
the terms of employee benefit plans.5 The plaintiff
insurance companies also argued that the regulatory
impact of section 47B did not fit within ERISA's savings
clause because it was beyond the scope of "traditional" 2
insurance regulation as contemplated by the ERISA savings
clause.53 The Supreme Court rejected the insurance
companies' arguments and found that Congress had
intended the savings clause to operate as a broad exception
to the general preemption clause.54
The court found that a proper reading of the savings
clause required the conclusion that the savings clause
"saved" state laws that directly regulated the substantive
terms of insurance contracts.' The Court observed that
state regulation of the substantive terms of insurance
contracts was a "traditional" method of regulating
insurance and as a result fell within the purview of ERISA's
savings clause. 5 The Court conceded that states, as a result
of this ruling, would be able to indirectly regulate the terms
of employee benefit plans.57
Massachusetts' victory in the Supreme Court seemed to
signal a clear victory for the states." Whereas ERISA had
50. See STATE HEALTH ADVISORY COUNcIL, supra note 10, at 60.

51. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co v. Massachusetts Travelers Ins. Co., 471
U.S. 724, 741 (1985).
52. Id. at 741-42.
53. See id.; see also ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A) (1974) (savings clause).
54. See Met Life, 471 U.S. at 739-41.
55. See id. at 741. Justice Blackmun stated that:
[Tihis distinction reads the savings clause out of ERISA entirely,
because laws that regulate only the insurer, or the way in which it may
sell insurance, do not 'relate to' benefit plans in the first instance.
Because [such state laws] would not be pre-empted by § 514(a), they do
not need to be 'saved' by § 514(b)(2)(A).

Id.
56. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts Travelers Ins. Co., 471
U.S. 724 (1985), 742-743 (stating that a "regulation regarding the substantive
terms of insurance contracts falls squarely within the saving clause as laws
'which regulate insurance.'").
57. See id. at 747.
58. See generally id. (allowing the states to accomplish through regulation of
the insurance industry that which they could not accomplish through direct
regulation of employee welfare benefit plans.).
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apparently brought an end to state regulation of employee
benefit plans; Massachusetts' section 47B, and other state
laws like it,59 signaled that states could indirectly regulate
the nature and extent of health care coverage in ERISAregulated benefit plans.
A recent count revealed that there are now over one
thousand state-mandated benefit laws on the books of the
several states. 60 State-mandated benefit laws have grown
from forty-eight in 1970 to over one thousand in 1991-now
"covering heart transplants in Georgia, liver transplants in
Illinois, hairpieces in Minnesota... and sperm-bank deposits in Massachusetts."6
State attempts to remedy ERISA's regulatory silence on
employee welfare benefits, however, both benefited and
suffered from the Met Life decision. In short, the Court took
from the states as much as it gave. Justice Blackmun fired
a parting shot in dicta-a shot that foretold a substantial
loss of ground for the states:
We are aware that our decision results in a distinction between
the insured and uninsured plans, leaving the former open to
indirect regulation while the latter are not. By doing so we merely
give life to a distinction created by Congress in the "deemer
clause," a distinction Congress is aware of and one it has chosen
not to alter.62

This line of reasoning had its origins in circuit decisions
dating back to 1977,3 but it was not until the Met Life
decision that the Supreme
Court endorsed this
59. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38-262b (Supp. 1985) (requiring coverage
for alcoholism); MD.ANN. CODE, art. 48A, § 477X (Supp. 1984) (requiring that
certain birth-defects be covered); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3923.25 (Supp. 1984)
(requiring coverage for outpatient kidney dialysis); ARIZ.REV. STAT. ANN. § 201402(5) (Supp. 1984-1985) (requiring coverage for reconstructive surgery for
insured mastectomies).
60. See Employee Benefit Research Institute, ERISA and Health Plans,
EBRI SPECIAL REPORT SR-31, Issue Brief No. 167, at 7 (1995) [hereinafter EBRI
REPORT].

61. John C. Goodwin, Health Insurance:States Can Help, WALL ST. J., Dec.
17, 1991, at A20.
62. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co v. Massachusetts Travelers Ins. Co., 471 U.S.
724, 747 (1985); see also Part IV.B (discussing FMC v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52
(1990), which made a holding of this Met Life dicta).
63. See Fox and Schaffer, supranote 7, at 245 (noting that the Circuit courts
had implied an ERISA mandated distinction between traditionally insured
plans and self-insured plans long before the issue reached the Supreme Court).
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interpretation. In drawing this distinction between traditionally insured plans and "self-insured" or "self-funded""'
plans, the Court prompted employers, large and small alike,
to self-insure their welfare benefit plans.'
C. Pilot Life v. Dedeaux
After the Supreme Court decided Met Life, there were
still many state laws of general applicability" that could
have potentially regulated the insurance industry." The
remaining question was whether Met Life would save such
laws of general applicability from preemption when those
laws were applied to the insurance industry.
In Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux," the Supreme Court
addressed this issue directly and held that ERISA
preempted state laws of general applicability. Dedeaux, the
plaintiff and respondent, brought an action against the
administrator of his employer's group disability plan (Pilot
Life, the petitioner)." Dedeaux relied on the Met Life
holding-that under the savings clause, ERISA did not
preempt state laws that regulated insurance.0 Dedeaux
argued that his claims were based on Mississippi's common
law of tortious breach of contract and that Mississippi's
highest court had consistently linked this common law
provision with regulating the insurance industry.7
64. See Lenhart, supranote 2, at 623 n.44 (pointing out that the terms "selfinsured" and "self-funded" are synonymous). It should also be noted that the
term "uninsured" is sometimes used as a synonym for "self-insured" or "selffimded" in reference to the fact that such plans do not purchase traditional
insurance contracts from a third party provider.
65. This distinction encouraged employers to self-insure their welfare
benefit plans because the self-insured insurance model allowed employers to
evade state-mandated benefits. See infra Part IV.A.
66. One example of a law of general applicability would be a common law
tort.
67. For example, a plaintiff could utilize the law of tortious breach of
contract in order to bring an action against an insurer and thereby regulate the
insurance industry. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
68. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
69. See id. at 43. Dedeaux's actual employer was a company called Entex,
Inc. See id. Entex provided its disability plan to employees by purchasing a
group insurance policy from Pilot Life. See id. Pilot Life became the defendant
in this action because Pilot Life denied Dedeaux a claim and it was Pilot Life
that had the fiduciary duty to determine benefit eligibility. See id.
70. Id. at 44.
71. See id. at 43. It is also worth noting, as the court did in Pilot Life, that
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The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with Dedeaux's
position and held that the savings clause applied only when
laws were "specifically directed toward [the insurance]
industry."72 The Court reasoned that the Mississippi common law provision of tortious breach of contract had not
been created with the intent to regulate the insurance
industry; that is, that Dedeaux's cause of action had its
"roots... firmly planted in the general principles of
Mississippi tort and contract law."73
PilotLife made clear that ERISA's savings clause would
not save state laws from preemption when those state laws

"developed from general principles" of common law.74
ERISA's

savings

clause,

then,

preserved

a

state's

traditional authority to regulate insurance, but only with
respect to state laws that were drafted specifically to
regulate the insurance industry and the business of
insurance.
D. Union Labor Life Insurance Co. v. Pireno75
The Supreme Court's decision in Pilot Life-to limit the
scope of the savings clause to state laws that had the
specific purpose of regulating insurance-is further clarified
by taking note of the Court's decisions in both Union Labor

Dedeaux was correct inasmuch as the savings clause of ERISA applies to "all
laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or any law of any State having the effect of
law, of any State." ERISA § 514(c)(1) (1974).
72. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 50; see also infra Part HI.D (regarding the test
for whether a state law is actually regulating insurance).
73. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 50. It was not disputed that these common law
causes of action "related to" an employee benefit plan. Indeed attorneys
regularly use ERISA to preempt state contract and tort claims that are brought
against providers or administrators of ERISA-covered employee welfare benefit
plans. See, e.g., Toledo v. Kaiser Permanente Med. Group, 987 F. Supp. 1174
(N.D. Cal. 1997). Plaintiffs who have their state claims preempted, however, are
not without remedy. See PilotLife, 481 U.S. at 55. However, these plaintiffs are
left to pursue ERISA-prescribed remedies that are often less than satisfying.
See ERISA § 502(g)(2) (1974). Under ERISA, a plaintiff whose health care plan
administrator had negligently denied health care services to the plaintiff;
thereby causing plaintiff to suffer life-threatening complications, would only be
able to sue for the cost of the denied benefits-that is, the costs for the medical
procedures that the plan administrator had initially denied to the plaintiff. See
id. (prescribing and limiting a plan participant's remedies).
74. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 51.
75. Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982).
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76 and Met Life.77 Under these
Life Insurance Co. v. Pireno
rulings, the state law must regulate activities that involve
the "business of insurance" in order for the law to fall under

the savings clause. 7' The Court in Pireno stated that the

test for whether a state law regulates the "business of
insurance" is a three part test: (1) does the state law
regulate in such a manner that it has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk; (2) does the state
law regulate in such a way that it affects an integral part of
the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured;
and (3) does the law impose requirements only on
insurers.79
By applying this test from Pireno, the Supreme Court in
Met Life held that the Massachusetts mandated benefits
law regulated the business of insurance. 0 The Met Life
court reasoned that by requiring insurers to include certain
benefits in their products, Massachusetts determined that
everyone who bought group health insurance should share
the risk of mental health care.81 Second, section 47B
regulated an integral part of the policyholder-insurer
relationship by "limiting the type of insurance that an
insurer may sell to the policyholder." 2 Third, section 47B
applied exclusively to insurers.83
76. Id. The Pireno decision dealt with an insurance company seeking an
antitrust exemption under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. See 458 U.S. at 126. In
interpreting ERISA's savings clause, courts have borrowed freely from decisions
dealing with the statutory construction of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. See e.g.,
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts Travelers Ins. Co., 471 U.S. 724
(1985).
77. In Met Life, the Supreme Court relied heavily on its decision in Union
Labor Life Insurance Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982), in order to define what
it means for a law to regulate insurance. See 471 U.S. at 741-44.
78. See Met Life, 471 U.S. at 744 (quoting SEC v. National Securities, Inc.,
393 U.S. 453, 460 (1969) ("[The focus [of the term 'business of insurance'] was
on the relationship between the insurance company and the policyholder.
Statutes aimed at protecting or regulating this relationship, directly or
indirectly, are laws regulating the 'business of insurance.'"). There is an
important distinction between a state law that regulates the relationship
between policyholders and insurers, and a state law that regulates that
relationship as a pretense in order to effect an independent policy concern. See
e.g., American Med. Sec., Inc. v. Bartlett, 111 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 1997).
79. See Pireno, 458 U.S. at 120; Met Life, 471 U.S. at 743.
80. See Met Life, 471 U.S. at 743.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id.
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Notwithstanding the success that Massachusetts had in
Met Life with the Pireno test, courts have since carefully
scrutinized whether a state law actually regulates the
business of insurance. In doing so, courts have limited
states' ability to affect the terms of employee welfare
benefit plans through direct regulation of the insurance
industry.
For example, in Tri-State Mach., Inc. v. Nationwide Life
Ins. Co.,84 the Fourth Circuit held that ERISA preempted a
claim based on a West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices
Act.85 The Tri-State Machine court found that ERISA
preempted the West Virginia State law in spite of the fact
that the state legislature drafted this statute exclusively to
regulate the insurance industry.86 Specifically, the court
reasoned that "this type of regulation is not unique to the
business of insurance, and it does not target, at least in
these provisions, the core business of insurance."" Thus, a
state legislature might draft a law that explicitly regulates
the insurance industry, yet ERISA could still preempt that
law if the regulation was not "unique to the business of
insurance... [and did not] target.., the core business of
insurance."88
Three years after the Tri-State Machine9 decision, the
Fourth Circuit expanded its suspicion of plaintiffs who
brought state claims against ERISA-regulated employee
benefit plans." In American Medical Sec., Inc. v. Bartlett,91
the circuit court refused to uphold an application of state
laws to ERISA welfare benefit plans when the state laws
merely "alleged" to regulate the insurance industry and the
business of insurance, but in fact had the "intended, stated
and actual effect" of reaching the relationship between

84. 33 F.3d 309, 313-14 (4th Cir. 1994).
85. See W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4 (1993). Notably, this statute appears to
regulate the insurance industry and even includes a subsection that addresses
unfair claim settlement practices. See id. § 33-11-4 (9).
86. The statute's facial concern with the insurance industry, however, failed
to persuade the Tri-State Machine court. See 33 F.3d at 316.
87. Id. at 314. The court went on to define "the core business of insurance"
as "contracts of protection under which risk is spread among policy holders." Id.
88. Id.
89. 33 F.3d 309.
90. See generally American Med. Sec., Inc. v. Bartlett, 111 F.3d 358 (4th Cir.
1997).
91. 111 F.3d 358.
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employers and employees.92 The issues raised by American
Medical Security are crucial93 and will merit further discussion later in this Comment.
In any event, the lesson is clear: simply because a state
law purports to regulate the insurance industry does not
mean that the savings clause will protect that law from
ERISA preemption.
IV. THE RISE OF SELF-INSURANCE

A. Background
An employer's welfare benefit plan is "self-insured"94 if
the employer has taken on certain risks and liabilities
connected with providing health care coverage-or any
other employee welfare benefit plan for that matter.
Employers that self-insure will often pay for employee
benefits with money from their own assets-money
sometimes kept in trust for that purpose.95 By self-insuring,
employers opt out of the traditional insurance model. The
traditional insurance model would involve the employer
contracting with third party provider of insurancewhether that be a Blue Cross/Blue Shield or an HMO.
Under this traditional model, the employer then pays
premiums and deductibles, and in exchange, the insurance
company agrees to pay for the large majority of plan
participants' medical costs in a given year.96
Recall that the Court in Met Life observed that which
Congress had provided for in ERISA: employers who
92. See id. at 363; see infra Part VI.D.
93. See infra Part VI.D.
94. "Self-insured" and "self-funded" are used interchangeably throughout
this note. See supra note 64.
95. See generally STATE HEALTH ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 60.
This public/private industry report defined self-insurance in the following way:
[t]he acceptance of risk by a company or plan for medical, dental, or
other covered claims incurred by plan participants. Self-insurance
occurs when an organization pays health or medical claims out of its
internal funds or by establishing a separate fund or "trust"... [c]laims
under self-insurance may be [and often are] processed under an
"administrative services only" contract [an "ASO"] with an insurance
carrier or another claims administrator.
Id. at v.
96. See id. at v.
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purchase insurance from third-party providers are subject
to "indirect" state regulation of their employee benefit plans
while those that self-insure are not subject to such indirect
state regulation.97 Under Met Life, employers that selfinsured their health care plans could avoid complying with
state-mandated benefits.
It is not entirely clear, however, that regulatory advantages were the reason that more and more employers began
to move towards self-insured benefit plans. In fact, a 1982
report concerning self-insurance in New York rebuffed the
inference that evasion of state insurance mandates
motivated employers to move towards self-insurance.98 The
same report posited that the trend was more likely caused
by considerations such as "greater concern for employee
health ... added participation in policy and planning activities... containing the cost of claims, improving cash flow,
and earning greater returns on reserves."99 In addition, a
1987 report on self-insurance in North Carolina indicated
that the trend had its origins in employers' desire
to treat employees in different States equally and to avoid State
premium taxes [and by employer's dissatisfaction with] the
slowness of many insurers to develop and use meaningful data for
cost containment... [as well as] by the impact of highInterest
rates in the early 1980s on cash management procedures.0 0

In switching to self-insured plans, employers were also
able to realize the benefits of "better access to information
and more control and flexibility in developing and
administering... [employee welfare benefit] plan[s]."' ° '
Self-finding a plan also permitted an employer to craft a
health care plan that was more neatly tailored to the needs
and risks of its particular work-force.
97. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts Travelers Ins. Co., 471 U.S.
724, 747 (1985) (dicta).
98. See STATE HEALTH ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 10, at ix.
99. See id.; see also Ann Winslow, The Financing of the U.S. Health Care

Industry, HARv. Bus. SCH. No. 196-095 (1995) (noting that reasons for selfinsurance include reductions in administrative and risk costs and avoidance of
premium taxes).
100. See Fox and Schaffer, supranote 7, at 252; see also Troy Paredes, Stop-

Loss Insurance, State Regulation, and ERISA: Defining the Scope of Federal
Preemption, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 233, 249 (1997).

101. See Paredes, supranote 100, at 249.

102. Mary Anne Bobinski, Unhealthy Federalism: Barriers to Increasing
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Furthermore, self-insuring allowed an employer to
avoid paying various insurance fees; fees which often
represented the insurer's profit margins. Self-insuring also
enabled employers to hang on to the money earmarked for
the welfare benefit plan until they absolutely had to pay out
on claims."°3 In this way, self-insured employers could earn
interest on this money while waiting to pay claims. Lastly,
employers that self-funded
could reclaim surplus money at
4
the end of the year.1
The position that most self-insured employers chose to
self-insure regardless of state-mandated health care benefits is also substantiated by data from the early 1980s,
which indicates that two out of three self-insured employers
in New York provided plan participants with all statemandated benefits.' 5
Notwithstanding hard data to the contrary, it is
disingenuous for employers to claim that the trend towards
self-insurance has had little to do with avoiding statemandated benefit laws, state anti-subrogation laws 106 or
other state laws that similarly protect employees' rights
under traditionally insured benefit plans.0 7 The 1982 report
concerning New York may not have detected employers'
desire to evade state mandates because it has only been
since the mid-1980s that state health insurance reforms
and benefit mandates have become more "frequent and
° In 1998, one commentator
aggressive."'O
noted that "[s]ince
1975 U.S. benefits have grown from 30 percent of payroll to
41.9 percent of payroll today. Nearly half of the increase is
due to the expansion of mandated benefits." 9
Health Care Access for the Uninsured, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255, 297 n.139
(1990).
103. See id.
104. See id. These advantages of self-insurance could begin to fade if employers purchase stop-loss insurance in order to protect themselves against
catastrophic loss. Whatever gains the employer may have realized in selfinsuring might be lost by the additional purchase of a stop-loss policy. See
generally infra Part V.
105. See STATE HEALTH ADVISORY COUNCIL, supranote 10, at ix.
106. See infra notes 110-115 (discussing the Holliday decision and antisubrogation law).
107. See Paredes, supranote 100, at 249 ("an employer who self-insures can
exploit ERISA's distinction between insured and self-insured plans and thereby
avoid burdensome and costly state regulation").
108. See EBRI REPORT, supra note 60, at 12.
109. Renate M. Nellich, Executive Partnershipsin Reinsurance, NATIONAL
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The North Carolina report is deficient in that it documents a rationale for self-insuring that is peculiar to large,
interstate
corporations. 1 '
These
large,
interstate
corporations
have
legitimate
interests
both
in
administering welfare benefit plans whose statutory
minimums are uniform from state to state-thus making
administration of employee benefits more efficient-and in
seeing better returns on their capital-a good portion of
which would typically go towards health insurance
premiums." Yet today's self-insurance terrain looks very
different from that of the mid-1980s. Whereas self-insuring
used to be a stratagem reserved for these large, interstate
corporations, today "the size of the employers that are selfinsuring has dropped dramatically.""1 Not only is the
average size of the self-insuring employer dropping, but just
as tellingly, the actual number of employers self-insuring is
steadily rising.13 In 1995, the Employee Benefit Research

Institute stated bluntly that "the growth of self-insurance
[today] is being driven much more by a desire simply not to
be under that more extensive state regulation."" In
addition, at least one recent court decision reflects the
court's awareness that this surge in self-insurance has
much to do with avoiding the burdens of state-mandated
benefits." 5
UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH-FNANCIAL SERVICES EDITION, Apr. 20, 1998.

110. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
111. See EBRI REPORT, supra note 60, at 12. ("in the early days it was
principally large employers that were motivated by their multistate status as
well as by financial considerations").
112. See id.
113. See Lenhart, supra note 2, at 616 n.1 (reporting that 67 percent of
employers self-insured their medical plans in 1992, compared with only 47
percent in 1986).
114. See EBRI REPORT, supra note 60, at 12 (noting also that small
companies' want to be free of state regulation not only in order to avoid
mandated benefit laws, but also so that they can have more latitude to set
deductible structures and have longer waiting periods); see also STATE HEALTH
ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 50 (noting in a separate appendix report
that "[i]nsurers were required by law to include in their health insurance...
specified mandated benefits... [r]ecognizing that these legislative mandates
only applied to licensed insurers, there was created an additional incentive for
certain employers to opt for a self-insured program.").
115. See American Med. Sec., 111 F.3d at 362 ("Apparently not wishing to be
subject to state-mandated health benefits, insurance companies and their
ERISA plan clients have entered into arrangements under which plans selffund benefits ..... ).
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ERISA did more than simply leave a regulatory vacuum
for employee welfare benefit plans. Judicial interpretation
of ERISA coupled with congressional silence has given
employers an incentive to self-insure and evade statemandated benefits-thus exacerbating the effects of the
regulatory vacuum.
B. FMC v. Holliday
In FMC v. Holliday,"6 the Supreme Court rejected the
argument that a fully self-insured employee welfare benefit
plan is, in fact, an "insurer" and therefore subject to
existing state insurance laws."' In Holliday, the petitioner
and plaintiff, FMC Corporation, provided health care
benefits to its employees through a self-funded health care
plan."' Notably, FMC's health care plan was entirely selffunded and was administered without the benefit of an
insurance policy provided by a third party."' FMC's health
care plan contained a subrogation clause which required
employees to reimburse the plan for medical costs if the
plan had covered the medical treatment of an employee's
injuries and that employee later received a damages award
for those injuries."
In Holliday, the employer sought a declaratory
judgment regarding an employee's (Holliday) duty to reimMs. Holliday, the respondent and
burse the plan.
defendant, claimed that Pennsylvania State law"'
invalidated her employer's subrogation clause. The court in
Holliday relied on both Met Life and ERISA's legislative

116. 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
117. Id.
118. See id. at 54.
119. Cf American Med. Sec., 111 F.3d at 360; Thompson v. Talquin, 928
F.2d 649, 652-53 (4th Cir. 1991) (involving employers who purchased stop-loss

insurance to cover themselves against catastrophic liability for costs incurred
from their self-funded health care plans).
120. See Holliday,498 U.S. at 54.
12L See id at 56.
122. Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, 75 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 1720 (1987). In relevant part, the law stated, "[fin actions arising
out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, there shall be no right of
subrogation or reimbursement from a claimant's tort recovery with respect
to.. . benefits ...paid or payable... under section 1719." Id. In this instance,
section 1719 refers to benefits paid under a "group contract.., for payment of
[health care] benefits." Id.
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history in holding that "the deemer clause... exempt[s]
self-funded ERISA plans from state laws that 'regulate
insurance' within the meaning of the savings clause."" 3 The
Holliday decision gave force to the Met Life dicta: state
insurance regulations would not apply to employers who
self-insured their welfare benefit plans.
C. The Deemer Clause and the FederalDuty to Intervene
Perhaps if we lived in a nation more concerned with full
access to health care, the deemer clause would not have its
present effect and ERISA would allow for state regulation
of all forms of insurance-whether traditionally insured
through a third party or self-insured. In such a world, the
Met Life decision would have been nothing but a shot in the
arm for states and their efforts to secure access to adequate
health care.'25 However, we do not live in such a nation and
this Comment does not propose that Congress will
imminently modify or, even less likely, eliminate the
deemer clause from ERISA." 6 Indeed, such a theory would
run contrary to what some have identified as ERISA's
crowning achievement-uniform federal regulation of
employee benefits.'
As noted earlier, Congress has both simultaneously acknowledged the need for regulatory control over the
123. Id.
124. "'[An employee benefit plan is not to be considered as an insurance
company, bank, trust company or investment company... for purposes of any
State law that regulates insurance companies [or] insurance contracts ......
Holliday, 498 U.S. at 63-64 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, p. 383
(1974)).
125. See generally Edward Alburo Morrissey, Deem and Deemer: ERISA
Preemption Under the Deemer Clause as Applied to Employer Health CarePlans
with Stop-Loss Insurance, 23 NOTRE DAME J. LEGIS. 307 (1997). The Note calls
for a modification of the deemer clause to allow for state regulation of selfinsured plans. Id. at 315. Furthermore, the author envisions that section 514(a)
would preserve the federal government's exclusive power to regulate
requirements of reporting, disclosure, fiduciary responsibility and general
operation and maintenance of any self-insured employee welfare benefit planthus preserving ERISA's interest in uniformity to an extent. Id. This theory
does not give sufficient weight to the ways in which state-mandated benefits
would substantially ignore ERISA's policy in uniformity.
126. See generally id. (advocating an evisceration of the deemer clause so to
allow the states to regulate self-insured employers as they regulated
traditionally insured employers).
127. See supra notes 6, 18.
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substantive terms of insurance contracts and effectively
denied that the same need exists with respect to regulating
the substantive terms of a self-insured plan."8 Nevertheless, the present state of the statute and of the
controlling decisional law does not and will not permit the
states to regulate employers who self-insure their welfare
benefit plans.
One solution is for the federal government to step into
the breach created by ERISA and comprehensively regulate
the substantive terms of employee welfare benefit plans.
V. THE STOP-Loss DILEMMA
A further wrinkle is added to this analysis, however,
when one considers an inevitable corollary to the trend of
smaller employers seeking the administrative, financial and
regulatory advantages of self-insuring employee welfare
benefit plans.'29 The overwhelming majority of these smaller
employers, though they seek the advantages of selfinsuring, are unable to assume the massive liability and
tremendous risk involved in such an arrangement. 30 In fact,
the vast majority of all employers that self-insure do not
assume all of the risks and liability. Rather, they purchase
stop-loss insurance to protect themselves against catastrophic loss in the event that claims far exceed their
projections.'
Stop-loss insurance is a relatively new player in the
area of health care insurance;' 2 its emerging role is owed
128. See STATE HEALTH ADVISORY COUNCIL, supranote 10, at 55.
129. Again, a business strategy formerly associated only with large
corporations that possessed broad bases of capital.
130. See Safeco Life Ins. Co. v. Musser, 65 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 1995). The

court noted that "ninety-six percent of all employers with less than 1,000
employees that sponsor self-funded plans ERISA plans purchase some form of
stop-loss coverage." Id. at 649.
131. See id. at 649; Lenhart, supra note 2, at 616 n.1 ("[sieventy-three
percent of self funded plans used stop-loss coverage [in 1992)"); see also
Morrissey, supra note 125, at 310 (stating that the purchase of stop-loss
insurance results often in the plan fitting under the category of "partially
fimded plan"); see generally EBRI REPORT, supra note 60, at 10 ("Stop-loss is
something where you don't normally expect to have a claim against the
coverage. Just like fire insurance on your house, you don't expect to have a

claim.").
132. See generally Lawrence Allen Vranka, Jr., Defining the Contours of
ERISA Preemption of State Insurance Regulation: Making Employee Benefit
Plan Regulation an Exclusively Federal Concern, 42 VAND. L. REV. 607, 636
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largely to the increasing numbers and diversity of
employers seeking to self-insure. Stop-loss coverage, in the
context of employee health care plans, means that the
employer is self-insured but then purchases a policy that
will "stop the bleeding" at a certain point. The stop-loss
policy generally insures either the employer itself or the
plan, and is "triggered" if the employer's Apayments on the
plan reach a certain point in a given year.'
Stop-loss policies discussed in this Comment come in
one of two forms: aggregate basis and individual/family
basis. In the aggregate model, the stop-loss policy will pay
out when the plan's total claims exceed projected claims by
a predetermined percentage."' In the individual/family
model, the same framework applies, except that the stoploss policy is triggered when any single participant 35 makes
claims above a certain amount (for example, $25,000 in a
given year). The point at which the stop-loss policy is
triggered is called the "attachment point."3 '
The Supreme Court has not had an opportunity to rule
on what effect the purchase of a stop-loss policy has on an
employer's self-insured status. However, the growing
consensus among circuit courts is that a self-insured
employer's health plan does not become a traditionally
insured plan nor does the employer actually purchase
health care insurance when the employer purchases a stoploss policy in order to protect itself or the plan against
catastrophic loss.'
(1989) (observing that stop-loss had been associated with insuring against
losses from fire, epidemic or other "catastrophes").
133. See STATE HEALTH ADVISORY COUNcIL, supra note 10, at v.

134. That is, the employer and the insurer would possibly agree that the
probable amount of total claims will be $50,000 in 1998. As a result, the stoploss policy would likely cover any amount above $57,500 because this figure
would represent 115 percent of aggregate projected claims for the year.
135. "Single" here includes a family unit.
136. See STATE HEALTH ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 10, at v.
137. See American Med. Sec. v. Bartlett, 111 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 1996); TiState Mach., 33 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 1994); Lincoln Mut. Cas. Co. v. Lectron
Prod., Inc., Employee Health Benefit Plan, 970 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1992); Brown
v. Granatelli, 897 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1990); United Food & Commercial
Workers & Employers Ariz. Health & Welfare Trust v. Pacyga, 801 F.2d 1157
(9th Cir. 1986); Thompson v. Talquin Bldg. Prod. Co., 928 F.2d 649 (4th Cir.
1991) (holding that employers that self-insure do not become "insured" plans
through the purchase of stop-loss policies, thus application of relevant state
insurance regulations is preempted). But see Michigan United Food and
Commercial Workers Unions v. Baerwaldt, 767 F.2d 308 (6th Cir. 1984);
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VI. CIRCUIT COURTS ON STOP-LOSS INSURANCE & ERISA

PREEMPTION

A. CircuitSplit and the PrevailingMajority Opinion
Certain circuit courts have held that an employer's
welfare benefit plan remains self-insured despite the fact
that the employer has bought a parallel stop-loss policy.138
These decisions represent the majority opinion, as well as
the more logical and persuasive school of thought.
Admittedly, there are compelling arguments to support the
position that an employer in fact has a traditionally insured
plan when it purchases a stop-loss policy from an insurance
company and also purchases administrative services from
3 9 Nevertheless, a
that same insurance company."
Supreme
Court review of this tangled question will more than likely
see the Court follow the growing majority of opinions
among the circuits, and hold that an employer's welfare
benefit plan is self-insured and therefore exempted from
state insurance regulations' 4° -whether
the plan is
Northern Group Services, Inc. v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 833 F.2d 85 (6th Cir.
1987) (holding that self-insured employer who purchases stop-loss policy
becomes an "insured" plan and thus is subject to state insurance regulations).
138. See supranote 137.
139. See Vranka, Jr., supra note 132, at 636 (alluding to the illogic that an
employer is actually self-insured when an insurance company has both issued
the employer a stop-loss policy and fully administers claims adjustmentsnoting that perhaps the insurer should properly be seen as the underwriter of
the employer's risk and the administrator of its claims -thus its "insurer");
Northern Group Services, 833 F.2d at 91 (reasoning that employer's stop-loss
insurance was "purchased to 'provide benefits for plans subject to ERISA'...
[t]hat the Plan pays a deductible [i.e. claims before the attachment point] does
not alter the fact that benefits playable above specified levels.., are
nonetheless insured") (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts
Travelers Ins. Co., 471 U.S. 724, 738 n.15 (1985)); cf Granatelli897 F.2d at
1357 (dissent) (reasoning that the employer's stop-loss policy is analogous to a
group health care policy even though the policy was directly liable to the
employer, not the plan's participants).
140. A recent Advisory Opinion from The U.S. Department of Labor defined
certain limits of the relationship between an employer's stop-loss policy and an
employee welfare benefit plan. See Op. PWBA Off. of Reg. and Interpretations
No. 92-02A (Jan. 17, 1992). In that case, the employer had purchased the stoploss policy in order to address its liability for the plan's obligations. See id. The
Advisory Opinion stated that an employer's stop-loss policy is not an asset of
the welfare benefit plan-even when the employer purchased the policy in order
to address its liability under the plan. See id.
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completely self-funded'' or only "partially funded."
B. United Food & Commercial Workers v. Pacyga'
The Ninth Circuit has held that an employer's welfare
benefit plan is still self-insured despite the existence of a
stop-loss policy because stop-loss policies generally cover
the employer or the plan-not the plan's participants
themselves. The Ninth Circuit's Pacyga decision represents
the leading decision on this issue.'
The Pacyga decision involved a plan administrator's
action for declaratory judgment against a participant
(Renee Ann Pacyga, defendant and respondent) in the
employee health care plan. 5 Ms. Pacyga had been injured
in an automobile accident and had subsequently filed a
claim for benefits with her employer's health care plan. 6
Before the plan's trustees would release these benefits to
her, however, they asked that Ms. Pacyga formally agree to
reimburse the plan if she ever collected damages from the
person responsible for her injuries."4 Although she did so
under protest, Ms. Pacyga consented to this arrangement.
The employee welfare benefit plan in Pacyga was
distinct from the plan that the Supreme Court would
analyze four years later in the Holliday decision. 149 That is,
the employer in Pacyga purchased a stop-loss policy to limit
its liability under the plan. 50 The court in Pacyga found it
irrelevant that the employer had purchased a stop-loss
policy in order to limit its liability:
141. See, e.g., FMC v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 54 (1990).
142. See, e.g.,American Med. Sec., 111 F.3d at 360.
143. 801 F.2d at 1158 (1988).
144. See Morrissey, supra note 125, at 311 (beginning its analysis of this
issue with discussion of Pacyga decision).
145. 801 F.2d at 1157.
146. Id. at 1158.
147. Id. at 1159. In its statement of the facts, the court notes that it was
evident early on that "a third party was at fault" in the accident. Id.
148. Id.
149. See FMC Corporation v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
150. Pacyga, 801 F.2d at 1159. The court indicated that the plan was
"entirely self-funded," but went on to note that the plan was "insured against
aggregate catastrophic losses by a 'stop-loss' policy...." Id. The terms "selffunded" and "self-insured" are used interchangeably. See supra notes 64, 94.
Four years after the Pacyga decision, in Holliday, the Supreme Court did note
that the employer in that action had not purchased a stop-loss policy in relation
to its liability under a self-fumded plan. 498 U.S. at 54.
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We held that a self-insured ERISA plan, which carried "stop-loss"
insurance, nevertheless was not an insurance company, nor did it
issue insurance contracts within the meaning of MetropolitanLife
Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts. The type of stop-loss insurance carried

by the Plan herein cannot be termed health insurance, nor can it
be said that the Plan is providing an insurance contract to its
participants.' 5 '

In its analysis, the Pacyga court concluded that the
employer's stop-loss policy did not make the employer an
insurer of the participants.'
Subsequent case law has
expanded that reasoning by also finding that stop-loss
policies do not "transform" an otherwise self-insured plan
into a plan that is "insured" by a third party provider. 53
Pacyga has laid the foundation for analyzing the role of
stop-loss insurance in the context of an employee welfare
benefit plan's self-insured status. Specifically, the Pacyga
court reasoned that the stop-loss policy did not alter the
plan's self-insured status because "[t]he stop-loss coverage
provides for payment to the Plan... [it] does not pay
benefits directly to the participants .... ."' In so reasoning,
the Pacyga court identified the critical issue surrounding
this dilemma: either the employer or the plan are the
parties liable to the plan participants, regardless of
whether the employer has purchased a stop-loss policy. The
stop-loss policy does not obligate the third-party insurance
company to provide direct payments or services to the
plan's participants.'
As a result, such stop-loss policies
cannot be considered health care insurance policies.
C. Thompson v. Talquin
In Talquin, the Fourth Circuit elaborated on Pacyga
and employed a highly formal understanding of liability in
order to draw a line between a traditionally insured and a
self-insured plan. In Talquin, the plaintiffs (the Thompsons) brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment

151. Pacyga, 801 F.2d at 1161.
152. Id. at 1161-62.
153. See, e.g., G.R. Herberger's, Inc. v. Erickson, 17 F. Supp.2d 932 (D.
Minn. 1998).
154. Pacyga, 801 F.2d at 1161.
155. Id. at 1162.
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against an employer's (Talquin) health care plan.'56 The
plaintiffs, both the injured boy and his mother, argued that
under Virginia State law the employer's health care plan
was required to provide coverage for injuries sustained in
connection with an automobile accident.' The employer's
health care plan, however, was self-insured.'58 The plan's
terms provided that beneficiaries of the plan were not
covered for injuries'suffered in connection with an automobile accident.'59
In light of the Supreme Court's holding in Holliday'5 with respect to the effect of state insurance regulations on
self-insured welfare benefit plans-the plaintiffs proffered
several arguments in an effort to avoid ERISA preemption
of the pertinent Virginia mandated benefits law."' In
relevant part, the Thompsons argued that the employer had
ceased to operate a self-insured health care plan once it had
purchased a stop-loss policy in connection with its liability
for the health care plan's costs. The Talquin court
responded unequivocally to this argument, and added
clarity to the Pacyga holding:
[Sitop-loss insurance does not convert Talquin's self-funded
employee benefit plan into an insured plan. Even with the stoploss coverage, Talquin's Plan is directly liable to Talquin's
employees for any amount of benefits owed to them under the
Plan's provisions. The purpose of the stop-loss insurance is to
protect Talquin from catastrophic losses, it is not accident and
health insurance for employees. Instead of covering employees
directly, the stop-loss insurance covers the Plan itself. Thus, for
the purposes of ERISA,6the Plan remains self-funded even with
2
the stop-loss insurance.

This ruling from Talquin made explicit that which had
156. Talquin v. Thompson, 928 F.2d 649 (4th Cir. 1991).
157. See supratext accompanying note 9.
158. Talquin, 928 F.2d at 651.
159. Id.
160. 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
161. Although not relevant for the purposes of this analysis, the Thompsons
did also argue that the "'deemer clause' only applies to how Talquin creates and
administers the Plan, and therefore the subject matter of the Plan remains
subject to state law regulation." Talquin, 928 F.2d at 652. The court summarily
dismissed this argument and relied on the Supreme Court's holding in FMC v.
Holliday in order to hold that "so long as the Plan can be categorized as selffunded, state law cannot regulate it." Id.
162. Id. at 653.
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been implied in the Pacyga decision: so long as stop-loss
insurance is payable to the employer or the plan, the plan's

status as self-funded will not be affected by the stop-loss
insurance. The Talquin holding gave life to a formal distinction that continues to vex commentators. 63
It can be argued that the formal distinction employed in
Talquin ignores the nature and the function of the stop-loss
policy. That is to say, employers often purchase a stop-loss
policy in order to protect themselves against unforeseen
liabilities under their health care plans. Under either the
stop-loss policy or a traditional group health care policy, a
payout by the insurance carrier is "triggered" by the very
same events: the medical costs of the plan's participants
reaching a certain level within a certain period of time."
Intuition and logic aside, Talquin was in fact just the
beginning of a series of similarly formal decisions.' Taken
together, these cases establish that there is no analytical
163. See Morrissey, supranote 125; Paredes, supranote 100.
164. See Paredes, supra note 100, at 283.
165. Federal courts almost invariably utilize a formal analysis when dealing
with ERISA matters. See generally Peter D. Jacobson & Scott D. Pomfret, Form,
Function, and Managed Care Torts: Achieving Fairness and Equity in ERISA
Jurisprudence, 35 Hous. L. REV. 985, 990-92, 1001-22 (1998) (detailing the
history of formal analysis in ERISA case law and calling for a change in this
approach). In fact, courts have extended formal analysis of ERISA matters well
beyond issues of ERISA preemption. For example, in Hicks v. Fleming
Companies, 961 F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1992), a laborer had received a brochure that
stated that he was covered by the employer's disability policy. However,
according to ERISA, a welfare benefit plan must be administered pursuant only
to the formal plan documents-as those documents are enumerated in ERISA. §
404(a)(1)(D). Under ERISA, employers must develop documents called
summary plan descriptions (SPD's) as well as written plan documents. ERISA,
§§ 102(a)(1); 402(a)(1); 404(a)(1)(D). Section 404(a)(1)(D) states that ERISA
benefit plans will be administered pursuant to the plan's formal documents. In
Hicks, the court held that the employee who had received the erroneous
brochure was not entitled to the promised disability insurance, because the
plan's formal documents, the SPD and the written plan document, did not
entitle that employee to the disability insurance benefits. 961 F.2d at 542-43. In
spite of the fact that the brochure had given the employee unequivocal
information to the contrary, the court found that the brochure was not a formal
plan document and that as a result the brochure had no effect on the plan's
obligations to the employee. Id. For a discussion of why courts should look to
use a less formal analysis when addressing ERISA issues see Peter D. Jacobson
& Scott D. Pomfret, Form, Function, and Managed Care Torts: Achieving
Fairness and Equity in ERISA Jurisprudence, 35 Hous. L. REV. 985 (1998)
(noting that while "formalism is the guiding light] in ERISA jurisprudence] ...
[flunctional analysis has.., advantages over the formal analysis courts
currently employ").
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link between the fact that an employer's plan pays benefits
to its participants and the fact that the stop-loss insurance
carrier indemnifies the employer or the plan against
catastrophic loss. Under this formal understanding, these
two considerations do not inform the determination of
whether a plan is self-insured. The employer essentially
acts as a "partition" between the plan's participants and the
stop-loss insurer's liability.'66 If the stop-loss policy named
the plan's participants themselves as the policy's
beneficiaries (rather than the employer or the plan), then
courts would presumably recognize that such a plan was in
fact traditionally insured. In such a case, the reviewing
court would be forced to recognize this distinction and
acknowledge that such welfare benefit plan was insured.'67
D. American Medical Security, Inc. v. Bartlett'68
Recently the Fourth Circuit has delivered a crushing
and, in all likelihood, fatal blow against states and their
hopes of circumventing ERISA's exclusive regulation of
employee benefit plans. In American Medical Security,
Maryland attempted to address a growing problem:
employers evading state-mandated health insurance
benefits by self-insuring their health care plans and then
purchasing a stop-loss policy in order to guard against
losses greater than what the employer was willing to
absorbY. Writing for the Fourth Circuit, Judge Niemeyer
related the problem that the Maryland Insurance
Commissioner perceived:
Thus, by absorbing a minimal amount of initial risk and insuring
the remainder through stop-loss insurance, [employers and their]
plans are able to provide health benefits of a kind or at a level

166. See American Med. Sec., 111 F.3d at 364 ("Participants and
beneficiaries in self-fimded plans may not have the security of the insurance
company's assets because stop-loss insurance insures the [employer's] plan and
not the participants.").
167. See e.g., Bone v. Association of Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 632 F. Supp. 493
(S.D. Miss. 1985). The majority of these cases have involved stop-loss policies
that have no reference whatsoever to the plan's participants. See supra note 137
(regarding the "majority opinion" decisions).
168. 111 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 1997).
169. Id. at 361-62.
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70
different from what State law requires of health insurance.

The situation prompted the Maryland Insurance
Commissioner to promulgate regulations which "require[d]
[self-insured] plans to absorb the risk of at least the first
$10,000 of benefits paid to each beneficiary." 171 If a selfinsured employer then failed to take on the minimum
amount of uncovered risk, the law would deem that
employer's stop-loss policy to be health insurance. 172 Thus,
such a stop-loss policy would be forced to carry Maryland's
various mandated benefits. 73
The Maryland Commissioner's regulation was based on
a basic understanding of what insurance is-the transfer of
risk from one party to another and the bearing of that risk
by one of the parties-that is, the carrier. 74 This simple
truth seemed to imply that an employer who claimed to be
self-insured, but who had had not taken on
75 a reasonable
amount of risk, was in fact not self-insured.
The American Medical Security court, however, found
the rationale of the Maryland regulation to be
unpersuasive. The court first found that the Maryland
regulations certainly "related to" an ERISA plan, and then
proceeded to determine whether the savings clause could
170. Id. at 362.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.; see also American Law Institute & American Bar Association,
What's New in Employee Benefits: A Summary of Current Cases and Other
Developments, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE - AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS: PENSION,
PROFIT-SHARING, WELFARE, AND OTHER COMPENSATION PLANS, Mar. 25, 1998, at

166.
174. See 1 COUCH ON INSURANCE §17:7 (3d ed. 1997) ("In order to have a
contract of insurance there must be a risk which is specified or capable of
identification, because coverage of a risk is the very essence of insurance."); see
also Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239 (1939) (holding that the
incidental involvement of an element of risk in a contract does not render the
contract one of insurance).
175. See American Med. Sec., 111 F.3d at 362. The court quotes the
commissioner to the effect that:
[a]t very low attachment points, however, a 'stop-loss' policy is merely a
substitution for health insurance... The goal is obvious: As policies
become available with attachment points lower than many deductibles,
it became an increasingly attractive option to 'self-insure' a health
plan, but to continue to shift the majority of the risk to the insurance
carrier by purchasing 'stop loss' coverage.
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prevent the regulations from being preempted.
In its savings clause analysis, the court relied on the
7 5 and
"business of insurance" framework set forth in Pireno
Met Life.'" Specifically, the American Medical Security
court observed that in order for the Maryland regulation to
fall under the savings clause, the regulation must affect the
issue of spreading risk for a policyholder; affect an "integral
part" of the insured and insurer's relationship and be
specifically directed at the insurance industry. 78
In determining whether the Maryland regulations
actually "regulated insurance" within the meaning of
ERISA's savings clause, the American Medical Security
court analyzed the regulations' purpose and effect.'
Maryland's minimum attachment points for stop-loss
policies 8 ' did force self-insured employers to take on more
risk, and as a result the regulation satisfied the first
element of the Pireno test. 8 ' Similarly, the regulation of
minimum attachment points addressed "integral" aspects of
the insured and insurer's relationship and limited its scope
to entities within the insurance industry. 18 2 As a result, the
Maryland regulation arguably qualified as a law
"regulating insurance" under ERISA's savings clause.
The court, however, took a cue from the Supreme
Court's Holliday decision, and refused to accommodate this
"backdoor attempt[ ]... to regulate core ERISA concerns in
the guise of insurance regulation."'83 The American Medical
176. 458 U.S. 119, 122 (1982).
177. 471 U.S. 724, 743 (1985).
178. American Med. Sec., 111 F.3d at 363.
179. It is ironic that the court employed such a functional analysis here,
given the prominent role that formal analysis has played in this particular
realm of ERISA preemption. Many courts have recently relied on a very formal
analysis when evaluating employers that self-insure their benefit plans but also
purchase stop-loss insurance. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
Courts have found that such employers are, in fact, self-insured because
regardless of how inter-related the stop-loss policy and the health care plan
may seem to be-the two issues remain discrete and independent concerns. See
supranote 137 (regarding the "majority opinion" decisions).
180. That is, stop-loss policies purchased in connection with potential
liability for health care costs under self-insured arrangements.
181. American Med. Sec., 111 F.3d at 363 ("Higher attachment points
burden plans with more risk while lower attachment points increase insurance
company risk.").
182. Id. at 363-64. That is, the extent to which one of those two parties is
legally obligated to retain a level of risk in the reinsurance relationship.
183. FMC v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 56 (1990) (citations omitted). The court
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Security court looked past the formal scope of Maryland's
regulation and concluded that the regulation was actually
an attempt to "reach the plan [and] participant
relationship, a relationship which is outside the insurance
industry."1 In so holding, the court chose to ignore the
literal import of the regulations' language, and instead
reasoned that the regulations had the purpose and effect of
preventing employers from evading state-mandated health
care benefits. As such, the regulations did more than just
regulate "integral" aspects of the insured and insurer's
relationship-they
impermissibly
regulated
the
relationship between the plan and its participants.
In addition, the regulations also affected employers that
sponsored the self-insured plans-entities outside of the
insurance industry.'85 In light of this analysis under Pireno
and Met Life, the Maryland regulations failed to qualify for
the protection of ERISA's savings clause.
VI.THE FUTURE OF ERISA PREEMPTION
A. Can States Recoup PowerBy Regulating Stop-Loss
Policies?
The Supreme Court's decision in Met Life was a
decision that faithfully mirrored the "give and take" schizophrenia of ERISA's preemption policies. 8 ' Met Life "gave" to
the states by confirming their ability to manage ERISA
plans through regulations of the substantive terms of
insurance contracts.' However, the same decision "took"
from the states the critical ability to regulate the substantive terms of employers that self-insured their welfare
benefit plans.'88 Justice Blackmun was aware of this
notes in dicta that it has long recognized and prohibited "state insurance
regulations that are pretexts for impinging upon core ERISA concerns." Id. at
63.
184. American Med. Sec., 111 F.3d at 363.
185. Id. at 364.
186. Cf. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), (b)(2)(B) (containing the savings and deemer
clauses, the former giving back to states the power to regulate insurance and
the latter taking a great deal of that power away and in so doing arguably
creating a dubious policy incentive for employers to self-insure in order to avoid
state insurance regulations).
187. See Met Life, 471 U.S. at 746; see also supraPart III.B.
188. See Met Life, 471 U.S. at 745.
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distinction, but he assigned to Congress whatever
responsibility there might be for such an outcome." 9
The American Medical Security decision has all but
foreclosed speculation that the states themselves might
remedy the regulatory vacuum that surrounds employee
welfare benefit plans. There has been some noise that the
states still have the power to salvage the power that Met
Life gave to them. 9 The gist of this argument is that
because the states cannot regulate the substantive terms of
self-insured plans directly, the states should begin to
regulate the substantive terms of stop-loss policies that selfinsured.employers are purchasing. 9 '
This argument-that the states have it within their
power to reach the substantive terms of stop-loss policiesalthough appealing on many levels, is not a sound one.'92
One proffered justification for allowing states to regulate
stop-loss policies has been based on the Supreme Court's
decision in New York State Conference of Blue Cross and
Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Company.93 The
Travelers court held that states may regulate in areas of
traditional state authority,'94 and in so doing may indirectly
affect the costs of administering a self-funded plan."'
However, the argument that Travelers also implies that
189. 471 U.S. at 747 ("By so doing we merely give life to a distinction
created by Congress in the 'deemer clause,' a distinction Congress is aware of
and one it has chosen not to alter."). Indeed, it is the ultimate contention of this
Comment that as the statutory and decisional law now stands, only Congress
has it in its power to remedy the present problem. See infra Conclusion.
190. That is, the power to indirectly regulate the ERISA welfare benefit
plan through substantive regulation of self-insured employer's stop-loss policies.
See Brown v. Granatelli, 897 F.2d 1351, 1353 (5th Cir. 1990) (observing in dicta
that it is not beyond the realm of possibility that state insurance regulations
could be crafted and applied to self-insured employer's stop-loss policies); see
generally Paredes, supranote 100.
191. See Paredes, supra note 100, at 259-62.
192. It should be noted that the court in Met Life upheld Massachusetts'
regulation in large part because the court found that regulation of the
substantive terms of insurance contracts was an area of traditional state
authority. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co v. Massachusetts Travelers Ins. Co., 471
U.S. 724, 740-41 (1985).
193. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
194. Id. In the Travelers decision, the state regulation involved mandatory
surcharges for hospital stays when the insurers were "commercial insurers...
self-insured funds... certain workers' compensation, volunteer firefighters'
benefit, ambulance workers' benefit, and no fault motor-vehicle insurance
funds .... " 514 U.S. at 650.
195. See Paredes, supranote 100, at 245; see Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656-57.
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states may regulate the substantive terms of self-insured
welfare benefit plans' stop-loss insurance must fail. Indeed,
there are marked differences between New York State
imposing generally applicable hospital surcharges in the
Travelers case,196 and another state passing a law requiring
that only particularstop-loss policies provide certain mandated health care benefits.
Although this logic did allow Massachusetts to prevail
in Met Life,'97 the analogy breaks down here when the facts
are expanded to include state mandates that would require
only certain reinsurance policies (that is, stop-loss policies
purchased in connection with health care plans) to carry
certain terms of coverage. State regulations that require all
commercially sold group health care policies to include
certain terms of coverage are, on their face, general
regulations of the insurance industry-laws passed with
the purpose and effect of regulating the insurance industry.
On the other hand, the analysis differs for a law that
requires only particularstop-loss policies to provide specific
terms of coverage in the event that an employer has
purchased the stop-loss policy as protection against
catastrophic liability from the employer's self-insured
health care plan. In other words, the purpose and effect of
such a law would be "[to] use stop-loss insurance policies as
a vehicle to impose the requirements of198 [state] health
insurance law on self-funded ERISA plans."
Furthermore, there is language in the Travelers
decision that would preclude a state's attempt to regulate
employee welfare benefit plans through the regulation of
those plans' stop-loss insurance policies. The Travelers
court found it significant that New York State's hospital
surcharges did not force ERISA plan administrators to buy
their hospital coverage from a Blue Shield plan. 199 However,
any state requirement that self-insured employers carry
certain health care coverage on their stop-loss insurance
would run afoul of the Supreme Court's warning in
Travelers, which stated:

196. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 661-62.
197. In Met Life, the Supreme Court upheld Massachusetts's mandates that
required certain terms of coverage for all commercially sold group health
insurance policies. 471 U.S. 724.
198. American Med. Sec., 111 F.3d at 364.
199. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 664-65.
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We acknowledge that a state law might produce such acute, albeit
indirect effects, by intent or otherwise, as to force an ERISA plan
to adopt a certain scheme of substantive coverage.. . and that such
§ 514.200
a state law might indeed be preempted under

Clearly, a state law that required self-insured
employers to provide certain minimum state-mandated
health care benefits would also dictate the extent of
coverage under an ERISA health care plan. Such a law
would run afoul of this admonition from Travelers.2"'
Any attempt to justify such a state law on other
grounds would be transparent and, in all likelihood,
dismissed as a ruse-a ruse designed to mask a state's
"back-door" °2 attempt at regulating an ERISA plan. A
state's attempt to regulate employee welfare benefit plans
by imposing this sort of conditional regulation on stop-loss
insurance would have "a much more direct impact on
employee benefit plans because [such regulations] would
appl[y] specifically to stop-loss insurance that is sold only to
benefit plans."2 3
In the end, state attempts to regulate the substantive
terms of stop-loss insurance may ultimately fail because
state regulators will not be able to deny the basic
differences that exist between group health insurance and
stop-loss insurance.
Unlike traditional group-health insurance, stop-loss insurance is
akin to reinsurance in that it does not provide coverage directly to
plan members or beneficiaries. Rather, most stop-loss policies...
provide coverage to the plan itself if the total amount of claims
paid by the plan exceeds the amount of anticipated claims by a
specified sum.

200. Id. at 668 (emphasis added).
201. Cf id. at 656. To require an employee welfare benefit plan to provide
certain coverage when that plan is self-insured would not only have the effect of
forcing that plan to carry state-mandated coverage, but it would also effectively
deem that plan to be an insurer by regulating that plan as the state might
regulate an insurance provider. See ERISA §514(b)(2)(B). Such a state law
would violate the rule set forth in Travelers inasmuch as the law would leave
self-insured plans that purchase stop-loss policies with no choice but to comply
with state mandates. See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 667-68.
202. See Holliday, 498 U.S. at 56 (citations omitted).
203. Analysis of CurrentRegulatory,Legislative and JudicialDevelopments,
TAx MGiMiT. COMPENSATION PLAN. J., RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, 115 (1996).

204. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 723 (2d Cir. 1993), rev'd on
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Other scholars have argued that ERISA's legislative
history would allow a court to find that the scope of ERISA
preemption should be loosened, so that the interests of plan
participants might be privileged over the interests in
uniform federal regulation. 5 Concededly, ERISA produced
an epic amount of legislative history.!0 The prospect of
mucking about in ERISA's legislative history does not hold
out the promise of unearthing a clear congressional intent
to champion the interests of plan participants over the goal
of uniform federal regulation. 7 On the contrary, exclusive
and uniform federal regulation of employee benefit law was
28
seen as "the crowning achievement of this legislation."

1

Furthermore, the statute's language itself provides
evidence that Congress anticipated the preemption
provision's

potential

for

creating

undesirable

and

sometimes inequitable consequences.2 9 In light of this
apparent awareness, it would appear that Congress was
prepared to unleash preemption for good and for ill; so that
ERISA could effect exclusive federal regulation of employee
othergrounds, 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
205. See, e.g., Paredes, supranote 100.
206. See generally David Gregory, The Scope of ERISA Preemption of State
Law:A Study ofEffective Federalism,48 U. PITr. L. REV. 427, 443-451 (1987).
207. ERISA's powerful preemption was one of the only aspects to this
massive social regulation in which business interests found any redeeming
value. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text. ERISA's sweeping
preemption of state regulation, then, can be seen properly as a crucial
concession to corporate America-a concession with which ERISA will not
readily part. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
208. See 120 CONG. REC. 29, 197 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Dent); see also
supra note 18 (containing Rep. Dent's remarks on this matter).
209. The deemer clause allowed employers whose group benefit plans were
self-insured to avoid, inter alia, state regulations and various transaction costs.
See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts Travelers Ins. Co., 471 U.S.
724, 741-42 (1985). Presumably, the fact that employers were self-insured
would detract from business that would have otherwise gone to insurance
companies. Section 514(b)(2)(B) suggests that ERISA's drafters were keenly
aware of the effects that ERISA's deemer clause was to have on the insurance
industry. Section 514(b)(2)(B) excludes self-funded life insurance policies from
the deemer clause. One can reasonably conclude that this provision was
intended to placate the insurance industry; an industry that stood to lose
business if employers began to self-insure all of their group welfare benefit
plans. By excluding life insurance from the deemer clause's language, Congress
assured the insurance industry that ERISA would not provide employers with
an incentive to self-insure their group life insurance plans. Section 514(b)(2)(B),
then, preserved life insurance policies as an insurance industry stapleunaffected by the deemer clause.
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benefits.
There is also an argument to be made for examining the
functional relationship between stop-loss policies and the
corresponding employee benefit plans.1 Under this line of
thinking, courts would assign less significance to the
formal, discrete categories assigned to stop-loss insurance
and self-insured plans.21' In other words, if the stop-loss
policy allows the employer to pay what are essentially deductibles under a traditional third party arrangement, then
the courts should see through the ruse and find that such a
plan is functionally insured. This line of thinking, while
persuasive, would also probably fail. Again, in interpreting
ERISA, courts have employed and continue to employ
highly formal analytical frameworks.212
B. Was American Medical Security a Mere Aberration?
Fred Nepple, chairman of the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners'213 Kansas City-based ERISA
working group, has communicated his belief that "the
Fourth Circuit's ruling [in American Medical Security]...
was an anomaly and other circuit courts [will] uphold"
regulations such as those that were found to be preempted

210. See generally Jacobson & Pomfret, supra note 165 (calling for a more
functional analysis of ERISA matters); see also, e.g., Brown v. Granatelli, 897
F.2d 1351, 1358 n.5 (1990) (Brown, J. dissenting) ("That the plan pays a
deductible does not alter the fact that benefits payable above specified levels,
either on an individual beneficiary or in the aggregate, are nonetheless
insured."); Michigan United Food and Commercial Workers Unions and Food
Employers Health v. Baerwaldt, 767 F.2d 308, 313 (1985) ("the plans include an
arrangement whereby the plans pay premiums to Occidental to insure that
Occidental will pay all benefits in excess of the claims liability limit under the
group policies. As long as the plans purchase insurance from 'an insurer
offering health insurance policies in' Michigan, the policies must include the
substance abuse coverage specified by Act 429.").
211. See supra Part VI.C (discussing formal understanding of stop-loss
arrangements).
212. See supra notes 164, 177 and accompanying text.
213. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners ["NAIC"] is an
"organization of insurance regulators from the 50 states .... The NAIC
provides a forum for the development of uniform policy when uniformity is
appropriate... the NAIC staff provides invaluable support to insurance
commissioners." Homepage of the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners, at <http'//www.naic.org/>, (collected on August 12, 1999, on file
with the Buffalo Law Review).
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in American Medical Security.214 The NAIC has assisted the
states in their efforts to regulate stop-loss insurance as
though it were health insurance by having its State and
Federal Health Insurance Legislative Policy Task Force
draft a Stop-Loss Insurance Model Act in 1992.215 In 1995,
the NAIC officially adopted this model act."
Undeterred by American Medical Security, certain state
legislatures and state insurance commissioners have
followed the NAIC's lead. For example, Minnesota recently
passed laws pushing self-insured employers to purchase
stop-loss insurance with certain minimum attachment
points. 217 The Minnesota laws require that:
A health provider cooperative shall not contract with a...
self-insured employer plan under section 62R.17 unless the...
self-insured employer plan maintains a policy of stop loss or excess
loss insurance from an insurance company licensed to do business
218
in this state in accordance with the following ...

. The statute then goes on to define what "stop loss"
insurance is by delineating different minimum attachment
points for employers of different sizes. A self-insured
employer in Minnesota with more than 750 employees
"must not maintain a policy of stop loss, excess loss, or
similar coverage with an attachment point less than 120
percent of the self-insured employer plan's annual expected
benefit costs."" 9 On the other hand, the law takes a
different view of stop-loss insurance when self-insured
employers with fewer than two hundred employees
purchase stop-loss coverage that has:
(1) has a specific attachment point for claims incurred per
individual that is lower than $10,000; or (2) has an aggregate
attachment point that is lower than the sum of: (i) 140 percent of
the first $50,000 of expected plan claims; (ii) 120 percent of the
214. Dan Lonkevich, NAIC Takes Second Look at Regulating Stop-Loss Sold
to Self-Insureds, NATIONAL UNDERWRITER PROP. & CASUALTY, Sep. 17, 1998
(availableon Westlaw at 1998 WL 9516985).
215. Model Laws, Regulations and Guidelines Accident and Health
Insurance Delivery Systems Stop Loss Insurance Model Act, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMSSIONERS (1998), available in WL NAICMODLRG Database.
216. See id.
217. See MINN. STAT. §§ 60A.235, 62R.19 (1998).
218. Id. § 62R.19
219. Id.
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next $450,000 of expected plan claims;
and (iii) 110 percent of the
22
0
remaining expected plan claims.

In addition, Pennsylvania and New Jersey have enacted
laws and regulations addressing when the state will deem
stop-loss insurance carriers to be health insurance
carriers-thereby subjecting "those carriers to state
mandates for health insurance policies.22'
As of the writing of this Comment, no federal district or
circuit court has had the opportunity to rule on these new
state regulations or on the issues that the Fourth Circuit
addressed in American Medical Security.22 However, the
Supreme Court recently weighed in, albeit passively, on
this debate. In June, 1998 the Supreme Court let stand the
Fourth Circuit's decision in American Medical Security and
denied Maryland's petition for certiorari.2 3 In doing so, the
Supreme Court may have merely intended to allow the
federal circuits an opportunity to sort out this issue.
However, if the Fourth Circuit's decision in American
Medical Security had been an "anomaly," then surely the
220. Id. §60A235(3)
221. See 31 PA. Code § 89.472 (1998). "The individual stop-loss amount; that
is, retention or attachment point per claimant shall be at least $10,000; the
aggregate stop-loss amount for the plan shall be, at a minimum, $100,000 per
calendar year." Id.; see also 40 PA. STAT. § 477b (1998) (providing statutory
authority). New Jersey requires more from self-insured employers than
Pennsylvania does:
"Stop loss".. . means an insurance policy designed to reimburse a selffunded arrangement for catastrophic, excess or unexpected expenses
wherein neither the employees nor other individuals are third party
beneficiaries under the insurance policy. In order to be considered stop
loss.., for purposes of the Individual Health Insurance Reform Act,
the policy shall establish a per person attachment point... or
aggregate attachment point.., or both, which meet the following
requirements: 1. If the policy establishes a per person attachment point
or retention, that specific attachment point or retention shall not be
less than $20,000 per covered person per plan year; and 2. If the policy
establishes an aggregate attachment point or retention, that aggregate
attachment point or retention shall not be less than 125 percent of
expected claims per plan year.
N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11 § 20-1.2 (1998).
222. But see Associated Industries of Missouri v. Angoff, 937 S.W.2d 277
(Mo. Ct. App., 1996) (holding that Missouri state insurance commissioner did
not have requisite statutory authority to regulate certain stop-loss insurance as
though it were group health insurance and declining to rule on issue of whether
ERISA would preempt such state regulation).
223. Larsen v. American Med. Sec., 118 S.Ct. 2340 (1998).
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Supreme Court would have righted the error and cleared
the way for the states to regulate stop-loss carriers that are
functioning as health insurance carriers. Tellingly, the
Supreme Court chose not to intervene.
Despite Maryland's defeat in American Medical
Security, and despite the Fourth Circuit's persuasive reasoning, some states continue to regulate stop-loss insurance
as though it were health insurance. In truth, this kind 22of4
stop-loss insurance is "still in the regulatory cross hairs."
Nevertheless, American Medical Security clearly threatens
those states that persist in these kinds of regulatory efforts.
C. Low Attachment Points-Modifying the Scope of the
Deemer Clause?
Fifth Circuit Judge Patrick Higginbotham hinted at the
possibility that, at some point, attachment points on a stoploss policy would be so low as to remove an employer's plan
from the realm of the self-insured. 25 In dicta from Brown v.
Granatelli, Judge Higginbotham opined that if an
employer's attachment point was "only the first $500 of a
beneficiaries' health claim... [then] labeling its coverage
stop-loss.., would not mask the reality that it is close to a
simple purchase of group accident and sickness coverage."22
Judge Higginbotham picked up on the very phenomenon
that so incensed the Maryland Insurance Commissioner in
American Medical Security: when standard deductibles in
group insurance policies are roughly equivalent to the
attachment points in stop-loss policies-employers are
effectively "insured" and therefore should not escape state
regulation." The American Medical Security and Travelers
decisions, however, make clear that federal courts will not
permit the states to use their power to regulate insurance
in order to define which benefit plans are insured and
which are truly self-insured.2 8
224. Self-Insurance Institute of America, Stop-Loss Insurance-Still in the
Regulatory Cross Hairs, at <http://www.siia.org/htdocs/legislative/leg99.htm
(collected on August 12, 1999, on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
225. See Brown v. Granatelli, 897 F.2d 1351 (1990).
226. Id. at 1355.
227. See American Med. Sec., Inc. v. Bartlett, 111 F.3d 358, 362 (4th Cir.
1996).
228. See id. at 363; New York State Conference of Blue Cross and Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
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A variation on Maryland's strategy in American
Medical Security could eventually succeed if Congress
amended ERISA itself to allow for the "minimum
attachment points" regulation attempted by Maryland.
Under such a plan, Congress would amend ERISA to
include a clause modifying the scope of the deemer clause. A
proposal for such federal reform might state that:
An employee benefit plan shall not be deemed to be an insurance
company, in the business of insurance, nor an insurer... for the
purposes of paragraph 514(b)(2)(B), if said state laws regulate an
employee benefit plan that is traditionally insured through a third
party commercial insurance provider. When an employer or
welfare benefit plan sponsor has purchased reinsurance for a
welfare benefit plan and that -reinsurance carries attachment
points for the employer or plan sponsor that: (a) are less than the
sum of the employer or plan sponsor's number of employees
multiplied by the sum of $10,000 (if the attachment points are
measured 22in9 the aggregate), or (b) average less than $8,000 per
employee.

The upshot of such federal reform, however, would
contravene traditional notions of federalism. That is, such
an amendment to ERISA would involve the federal
government regulating the insurance industry-an area of
regulation reserved historically to the several states.30
In addition, such an amendment would have Congress
going out of its way to defeat its own legislative purpose
and intent in ERISA: effecting uniform regulation of
employee benefits. Admittedly, the Supreme Court in Met
Life has already signaled that the savings clause will, in
part, compromise the goal of exclusive and uniform federal
regulation.231' Notwithstanding the concession to states'
interests embodied in the savings clause, it is unlikely that
Congress would exacerbate ERISA's schizophrenia by
asserting exclusive federal regulation of employee benefits
and then simultaneously exposing those benefit plans to
disparate state regulations. Put another way, any ERISA
amendment that allows individual states to regulate benefit
229. Under ERISA's current structure, such a provision would likely appear
as section 514(b)(2)(B)(i)-and would no doubt be more artfully and carefully by
a subcommittee staff.
230. See McCarran-Fergason Act of 1945, 15 U.S.C. § 1011, et seq. (1992).
231. 471 U.S. 724; see also ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A).
232. See generally supranotes 6, 18 and accompanying text.
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plans is unlikely because it would destroy uniform
regulation of employee benefits for tens of thousands of
small and mid-sized employers."'
CONCLUSION

In essence, the states are powerless to fill the persistent
regulatory gaps which ERISA created. At the time of
ERISA's passage, many of its sponsors might have believed
that the interests of plan participants would not require the
states' protection." Many experts and analysts were
predicting that the federal government would intercede
with comprehensive regulation or "perhaps even national
health insurance."" 5 Given the benefit of hindsight, the
aforementioned reliance on the federal government was illadvised."
As politically unpopular as it may be to say, it is
nevertheless true: ERISA plan participants need an active
and "big" federal government to intervene on their behalf.
This Comment does not suggest that the federal
government should begin to dabble in the substantive
regulation of insurance contracts themselves.237 Instead, the
federal government should acknowledge that ERISA has
blocked and thwarted states' efforts to ensure that
employee health plans include all reasonable and necessary
terms of coverage. The combination of self-insurance and
stop-loss policies has allowed employers to take on a limited
amount of risk and then deny participants that which the
states have determined to be the bare minimum of health
care coverage. 35
233. Recall that large employers have self-insured their employee benefits
for irrespective of regulatory advantages and have less need of low attachment
points on stop-loss insurance because of their economies of scale. See supra Part

IV.A_
234. See Fox and Schaffer, supranote 7, at 244-45.
235. Id. at 244; see also Kenneth R. Wing, The Impact of Reagan-Era
Politics on the Federal Medicaid Program, 33 CATH. U.L. REV. 1, 23-24 & n.
91(1983) (providing a brief overview of President Carter's failed press for
national health insurance).
236. See supra Part III.A (discussing President Carter's failed attempt at
national health care reform and President Reagan's push towards
deregulation).
237. The McCarran-Ferguson Act reserved this power to the states. See
supranote 29 and accompanying text.
238. See supranotes 108-115 and accompanying text; see also supra Parts V,
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The time has come for the federal government to fill the
regulatory vacuum that it created when it passed ERISA.
Filling this void can be accomplished by regulating the
substantive terms of employee welfare benefit plans
themselves. Although the Clinton administration failed in
its attempts to champion comprehensive national health
care reform,239 the federal government has demonstrated
that it knows how to mandate health care benefits. Unlike
state mandated benefits, these federal mandates apply to
traditionally insured plans and self-insured plans alike.24
For example, The Newborns' and Mothers' Health
Protection Act of 1996 requires, inter alia:
..In general: A group health plan, and a health insurance issuer
offering group health insurance coverage, may not: (A) except as
provided in paragraph (2): (i) restrict benefits for any hospital
length of stay in connection with childbirth for the mother or
newborn child, following a normal vaginal delivery, to less than 48
hours, or (ii) restrict benefits for any hospital length of stay in
connection with childbirth for the other or newborn child, following
a cesarean section, to less than 96 hours, or (B) require that a
provider obtain authorization from the plan or the issuer for
prescribing any length of stay required under subparagraph (A)
(2)).
(without regard to paragraph

Congress passed the Newborns' and Mothers' Health
Protection Act, however, only in reaction to public outcry
over highly publicized "drive-through" deliveries. Indeed,
the federal government has a history of mandating benefits
in an ad hoc manner by "chipping away" from year to
year. 3 The federal government's strategy on this front has
been aptly characterized as "'mandate by body part."'' " This
VI.
239. See The President's Health Sec. Act, Title VII of H.R. 3600, S. 1757 and
S.1775 (Nov. 20, 1993).
240. See, e.g., Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996, 42
U.S.C. § 300gg-4 (1997); Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C. § 1185a,
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5 (1997).
241. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4 (1997).
242. See, e.g., Shelby Gilje, Health Coverage: What Women Need To Know,
THE SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 25, 1998, at D1.
243. See Self-Insurance Institute of America, New ERISA Mandates
Chipping
Away
at
Self-Insured
Health
Plans,
at
<http'/
www.siia.org/htdocs/legislative/leg99.htm> (collected on August 12, 1999, on file
with the Buffalo Law Review).
244. See id.
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trend continued with the 105th Congress. "Provisions added
at the 11th hour in the omnibus budget bill" passed by the
105th Congress will require self-insured plans to "provide
certain [benefits] following a mastectomy." 24 On October 21,
1998, President Clinton signed this narrow provision into
law. 6 The Women's Health and Cancer Rights Act of 1998
certainly brought about needed change for female
participants in all ERISA-regulated health plans-selfinsured and traditionally insured alike. However, the
federal government's approach toward mandated benefits
needs to be proactive and comprehensive rather than ad hoc
and reaction based. Notably, Congress already mandates
that the states' Medicaid programs provide recipients with
a particular group of benefits.
The present situation demands that the federal
government abandon its policy of "mandate by body part"
and craft a reasonable though comprehensive set of
mandated benefits for self-insured health plans. The federal
government must fulfill this duty to ERISA plan
participants; a duty that it assumed in 1974 when it
established itself as the exclusive regulatory authority of
employee benefits.

245. Self-Insurance Institute of America, New Mandate in Budget Bill
Impacts Health Plans, at <http:/vww. siia.org/htdocs/vhatsnew/> (collected on
August 12, 1999, on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
246. See The Women's Health and Cancer Rights Act of 1998, P.L. 105-277,
112 Stat. 2681 (1998); see also Self:Insurance Institute of America, New
Mandate
in
Budget
Bill
Impacts
Health
Plans,
at
<http//www.siia.orghtdocs/whatsnew/>
(providing date of the signing)
(collected on August 12, 1999, on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
247. See Ann Winslow, The Financing of the U.S. Health Care Industry,
HARv. Bus. SCHOOL, No. 196-095 (1995). "The federal government stipulates the
minimum health services that the states must provide under Medicaid. They
include inpatient hospitalization, outpatient hospital services, services at rural
health clinics, laboratory and x-ray tests, SNF care, physician services, home
health care, nurse-midwife services, and pediatric nurse practitioners." Id.

